Decoy Enforcement of Homosexual Laws by Jacobs, Harold
DECOY ENFORCEMENT OF HOMOSEXUAL LAWS
Because the generally covert and consensual nature of homosexual
offenses creates difficult enforcement problems,' police in many cities 2 use
decoys to uncover male homosexual overtures in such public places as parks,
transportation terminals, and rest rooms.3 These overtures are often so
subtle that a casual observer could not recognize them. Indeed, in some
cases the ability to recognize a veiled overture almost amounts to a "sixth
sense." - The advance may start with a lingering or inquiring look,5 lead-
ing to innocent but exploratory conversation.6 The conversation may be
tinged with suggestions of effeminacy 7 in tone of voice 8 excessive lip and
tongue movements,9 unusual use of superlatives, 10 and overenunciation of
1 Even unwilling victims or participants are often reluctant to report the offense
to the police. See Bowling, The Sex Offender and Law Enforcement, Fed. Prob.,
Sept 1950, pp. 11-14; cf. Goodsaid v. United States, 187 A.2d 486, 487 n.1 (D.C.
Munic. Ct App. 1963).
2 New York: see, e.g., People v. Feliciano, 10 Misc. 2d 836, 173 N.Y.S.2d 123
(Magis. Ct 1958) ; Philadelphia: see Fonzi, The Furtive Fraternity, Greater Phila-
delphia, Dec. 1962, p. 20; University of Pa. Institute of Legal Research & University
of Pa. Law Review, Field Study of Philadelphia Police Enforcement of Sex Crimes,
1961 (unpublished study financed by the Harrison Foundation, in University of Pa.
Law Review Library) [hereinafter cited as Field Study]; Pittsburgh: see DEUTSCH,
THE TROUBLE WrrH Cops 76 (1955); District of Columbia: see, e.g., McDermett v.
United States, 98 A.2d 287 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953).
3 Another possible means of deterring potential offenders might be the placement
of conspicuously uniformed policemen in locations frequented by homosexuals. See
Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution, Report, Can. No. 247, at 78
(1957). However, this practice might cause homosexuals to seek new locations. Con-
tainment is a legitimate objective in police enforcement. See Helmer, New York's
Middle Class Homosexuals, Harpers, March 1963, pp. 85, 86-87; Fonzi, supra note 2,
at 52.
The placement of spies at well-known locations is a third alternative. If the spy
attempted to surprise the defendants while they were in the midst of their criminal
behavior, this might present unlawful search problems. Compare Britt v. Superior
Court, 58 Cal. 2d 480, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962) (enclosed toilet booth;
unreasonable exploratory search), and Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371
P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962) (same), and 63 COLUM. L. Rxv. 955 (1963), with
People v. Young, 214 Cal. App. 2d 143, 29 Cal. Rptr. 492 (Dist Ct. App. 1963)
(toilet booth not enclosed), and People v. Norton, 209 Cal. App. 2d 176, 25 Cal. Rptr.
676 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (same). Compare Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129 (1942), with Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). More importantly,
the spy would have a difficult task since homosexual overtures are often spoken quietly.
If the defendants come to the location merely to meet each other and proceed elsewhere
to pursue their objectives, the spy would have to follow them.
4 STEARN, THE SIXTH MAN 55 (1961).
5 See CORY, THE Ho osExuAL iN A m McA 118 (2d ed. 1960); HENRY, SEX
VARIANTS 286 (1955) ; STEARN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 51, 59, 61; Cf. WESTWooO, A
MiNoRrry: A REPORT ON THE LIFE OF THE HomosExUAL iN GREAT BrAiN 81-82, 84,
86 (1960).
B See CoRY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 117.
7But cf. PLOSCOWF, SEX AND THE LAW 196 (1951).
8 See CORY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 117; HENRY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 291;
STEARN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 47.
9 See HENRY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 286.
10 Cf. WEsTwooD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 84-85.
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particular syllables and words. Suggestion also may be conveyed by hold-
ing a cigarette in an effeminate way," affectation in hand movements,'12 or a
"middle-size enigmatic smile." 13 The use of conversational gambits,1 4
such as that the weather makes one feel "hot," 15 or words like "gay" or
"straight" "I provide additional clues. Ultimately, there may be an in-
vitation to stop at a bar for a glass of beer 17 and then to come to the apart-
ment for a drink or "some fun." 18
Since the defendant's behavior may be too ambiguous to insure con-
viction for a particular homosexual offense, the decoy may try to elicit more
overt conduct. The manner in which the decoy elicits that conduct is
significant because his ability to secure convictions "I depends to a large
extent upon the defenses which an accused may raise because of the decoy's
behavior. Moreover, the decoy situation itself gives rise to slippery prob-
lems of proof when, as is often the case, only the communicants perceive
the subtle interchange.
Since the status of being a homosexual is not itself criminal, prosecu-
tions for homosexual acts must be conducted with particular caution:
The personal abhorrence upon the part of the court for the conduct
attributed to the defendant . . . is altogether beside the point.
[This] is a prosecution . . . under a specific statute.
.. No conviction can be justified unless the facts fit into the
statute.20
The use of decoys complicates the problem further: "Cases of this nature
have difficult and troubling aspects. They involve not only statutory con-
struction, but also moral considerations, social interests, [and] police
practices . ... ," 21
11 Cf. ibid.
12 See CORY, op. cit. .spra note 5, at 117.
13 STEARN, op. cit. sipra note 4, at 61.
14 Cf. WESTWOOD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 84-85.
15 See CORY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 117.
16CORY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 108-09; cf. Field Study 8. Compare People v.
Johnson, 99 Cal. App. 2d 559, 560-61, 222 P.2d 58, 60 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950) ("straight"
is offer to buy or sell narcotics).
17 CoRY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 118.
18 People v. Humphrey, 111 N.Y.S.2d 450, 452 (Broome County Ct. 1952); see
King v. United States, 90 A.2d 229 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953) ; People v. Feliciano,
10 Misc. 2d 836, 173 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Magis. Ct. 1958); People v. Pleasant, 23 Misc.
367, 371, 122 N.Y.S.2d 141, 145 (Magis. Ct. 1953).
19 The use of decoys to harass homosexuals by threats of exposure or prosecution
may make the homosexuals less likely to annoy strangers. Even though homosexuals
who look for partners in public parks, restrooms, and transportation terminals are
unlikely to have stable friendships with other homosexuals, see Helmer, supra note 3,
at 87; Field Study 37, they will, nevertheless, communicate their experiences with
decoys, and many homosexuals may exercise restraint in approaching strangers in
order to avoid decoys. See Watson, Psychiatry for Lawyers 73 (mimeo ed. 1957).
20 People v. Feliciano, 10 Misc. 2d 836, 839, 173 N.Y.S.2d 123, 126 (Magis. Ct.
1958) ; accord, People v. Humphrey, 111 N.Y.S.2d 450, 455 (Broome County Ct. 1952).
21 Henderson v. United States, 117 A.2d 456, 458 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1955).
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I. CONDUCT NECESSARY To ESTABLISHE A CRIMINAL
HOMOSEXUAL OVERTURE
The aggressiveness of conduct necessary to establish a particular homo-
sexual offense determines the scope of the decoy's activity.
A. Clear Communication of Willingness
1. Communication Offenses
Many statutes proscribe sexually directed communications generally 22
or homosexual communications in particular 2 by prohibition of soliciting,
enticing, inviting, proposing, or inducing. Often these statutes do not
limit the offense to public places,2 4 but seem to make the sexual communica-
tion unlawful because it indicates sufficient predisposition to commit a more
consummate crime -- such as sodomy 28
Although the word solicitation may connote importunity, 7 courts
generally have not required independent establishment of that concept, but
recognize its presence in any clear communication of willingness to engage
in prohibited conduct.2 8 Although close statutory construction is necessary
in homosexual cases, the search for some separately identifiable element of
importunity misconceives the application of the rule of strict construction by
focusing only upon the dictionary meaning of one particular word without
regard to the connotations suggested by the factual setting in which the
2 2 E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 647(a), (d); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:170-5 (1953).
Many of these statutes use general language such as soliciting lewd or indecent acts.
This language is intended to reach at least all otherwise unlawful sexual conduct,
and is not void for vagueness. See State v. Milne, 187 A.2d 136, 138-41 (R.I. 1962),
appeal dismissed, 373 U.S. 542 (1963).
23HAWAII REv. LAWS §314-2(g) (1955); NEW YORK PEN. LAW §722(8).
Many statutes create an offense which rises to felony proportions. E.g., Micr.
Comp. LAWS § 750.338 (Supp. 1956); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4502 (1963).
24E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §41-3202 (1957); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §40-2-31
(1953).
2 Sodomy may include any form of unnatural copulation, see, e.g., State v. Milne,
187 A.2d 136, 138-40 (RI. 1962), appeal dismissed, 373 U.S. 542 (1963) ; MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 617.14 (1947); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.44 (Page 1954), or may be
restricted to anal copulation only, see, e.g., Barton v. State, 79 Ga. App. 380, 53 S.E.2d
707 (1949) ; Commonvealth v. Poindexter, 133 Ky. 720, 118 S.W. 943 (1909) ; Prindle
v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 551, 21 S.W. 360 (1893). See generally MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 207.5, comment at 279 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
26 Compare Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the
Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Con-
spiracy, 61 COLUA. L. Rxv. 571, 572, 622, 627-28 (1961), with State v. Milne, supra
note 25, at 141. However, soliciting lewdness statutes which derive from common law
nuisance, e.g., ARu. STAT. ANN. § 41-32-02 (1957), may be directed against the nuisance
effect of the defendant's conduct upon actual or potential perceivers. Cf. Rittenour v.
United States, 163 A.2d 558 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1960) ; 70 YALE L.J. 623-25 (1961).
27See WEBSTER, THRDP NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 2169 (1961).
28 The following cases deal with prostitutes and procurers: People v. Phillips,
70 Cal. App. 2d 449, 453-54, 160 P.2d 872, 874 (Dist. Ct. App. 1945) ; see State v.
Render, 203 Iowa 329, 210 N.W. 911 (1927) ; cf. Golden v. United States, 167 A.2d
796 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1961); Cunningham v. United States, 86 A.2d 918 (D.C.
Munic. Ct. App. 1952); Curran v. United States, 52 A.2d 121 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App.
1947) ; Hall v. United States, 34 A.2d 631 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1943).
1963]
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word must necessarily be applied. As in the case of prostitution, homo-
sexual communications are often directed toward sympathetic recipients.
Accordingly, any communication which expresses a willingness to engage
in homosexual activity should constitute an offense under a statute con-
cerned with a later, more consummate crime. Similarly, any clear com-
munication of homosexual willingness should constitute a violation of a
statute 29 which is intended only to curtail the annoying effect of homo-
sexual overtures upon the public.30
Most of the cases which show a possible application of this "willing-
ness" standard to homosexual communications have been decided under
the New York Penal Law section 722(8).31 Although this statute also
requires loitering and provocation to a breach of the peace, the courts have
treated the soliciting aspect as an independent element of the crime,32 and
several courts have recognized in dictum that solicitations can occur in
subtle ways.33 In addition, assertive conduct as well as mere use of words
can constitute a solicitation. For example, in People v. Strauss,'4 a person
who touched the private parts of another man standing at an adjacent urinal
was found to be soliciting. By way of contrast, in People v. Humphrey,3 5
2 9 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 647(a), (d); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-15 (1953);
An Act To Provide for the Treatment of Sexual Psychopaths in the District of Colum-
bia, and for Other Purposes, ch. 428, § 102, 62 Stat 346 (1948) (now D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 22-2701 (1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6101 (1953); HAWAII REv. CODE § 314-2
(1955); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 722(8); MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962); MODEL PENAL CODE §207.5(4) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
30 See 70 YALE L.J. 623, 623-25 (1961).
31 Any person who with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby
a breach of the peace rfiay be occasioned, commits any of the following acts
shall be deemed to have committed the offense of disorderly conduct: . . .
8. Frequents or loiters about any public place soliciting men for the pur-
pose of committing a crime against nature or other lewdness ....
N.Y. PEN. LAW § 722(8) ; accord, HAWAII R-v. LAWs § 314-2(g) (1955).
32 See People v. Evans, 19 Misc. 2d 1071, 192 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Ct. Spec. Sess.
1959), rev'd without opinion, 7 N.Y.2d 1030, 166 N.E.2d 861, 200 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1960) ;
People v. Feliciano, 10 Misc. 2d 836, 173 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Magis. Ct. 1958); People v.
Burnes, 178 N.Y.S.2d 746 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1958) ; People v. McCormack, 9 Misc. 2d
745, 169 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1957) ; People v. Pleasant, 23 Misc. 2d 367,
122 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Magis. Ct. 1953); People v. Humphrey, 111 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Broome
County Ct. 1952).
33 People v. Evans, sipra note 32, at 1072, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 145-46; People v.
Burnes, supra note 32, at 749; People v. McCormack, supra note 32, at 747, 169 N.Y.
S.2d at 142; People v. Pleasant, supra note 32, at 369-70, 122 N.Y.S2d at 144.
34 114 N.Y.S.2d 322 (Magis. Ct 1952) ; cf. People v. Evans, 19 Misc. 2d 1071,
192 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Ct Spec. Sess. 1959) (dictum).
35 111 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Broome County Ct. 1952). The court refused to consider
the defendant's conduct immediately prior and subsequent to the invitation for the
purpose of clarifying the ambiguity. Id. at 454. However, in People v. Pleasant,
23 Misc. 2d 367, 122 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Magis. Ct. 1953), similar evidence may have been
used for that purpose. When homosexual communications are proscribed because
they are nuisances or tend to provoke breaches of the peace on the part of perceivers,
the criminality of the communication is dependent upon whether it has such potential
effects and should be determined solely by reference to the objective content and
manner of the communication itself. And when the communication is proscribed
because it is a step toward more consummate crime, surounding circumstances tend-
ing to show the defendants intent should be taken into account. See King v. Cope,
16 Crim. App. R. 77 (Eng. 1921); cf. Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 26, at
627-28.
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the court held that defendant's invitation to a casual acquaintance to come to
his apartment for some "beer, candy and fun" was too ambiguous, and in
Commonwealth v. Yeager,"6 decided under a Pennsylvania soliciting stat-
ute, 3 the court held that a defendant who touched the exposed private parts
of A in the presence of B did not solicit B 3 8 Strauss, Humphrey, and
Yeager all seem to support the standard of a clear communication of willing-
ness; in one the standard was met, while in the other two it was not.
Three other cases arising under section 722(8) seem to require an
element of importunity in addition to willingness, but their reasoning is
of limited applicability. People v. Feliciano 3 9 held that a communication
of willingness, so vivid that the court considered it too obscene for repeti-
tion, was not a solicitation because it was "casual, friendly conversation." 4-
The court's concern with the necessity of finding a potential breach of the
peace 41 makes its analysis inapplicable to statutes not directed at breaches
of the peace. In People v. Burnes 4 and People v. McCormack,43 the de-
fendants' conduct-going in and out of toilet booths in the first case and
engaging in onanism while looking around and smiling in the second-was
probably too ambiguous to constitute a clear manifestation of homosexual
willingness, let alone a separately identifiable importunity. Therefore,
despite these cases, behavior that clearly indicates willingness may be
sufficient to constitute a homosexual communication offense under a stat-
ute directed at nuisances. In addition, even an ambiguous communication
might be sufficient to support a conviction under a statute concerned with
prevention of more consummate offenses if there was other evidence
demonstrating the defendant's intention."
2. "Inchoate" Communication Offenses
In addition to a clear communication of willingness, statutory proscrip-
tions of soliciting, inviting, and enticing apparently require that the first
homosexual communication come from the defendant.L5 Initiating conduct
is not as clearly required, however, by statutes which forbid loitering for
the purpose of soliciting or engaging in perverted acts 46 in order to prevent
3621 Monroe Legal Rptr. 205 (Pa. Ct. Quarter Sess. 1958).
37 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4502 (1963).
38 21 Monroe Legal Rptr. at 207.
39 10 Misc. 2d 836, 173 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Magis. Ct 1958).
40 Id. at 841, 173 N.Y.S.2d at 127 (Magis. Ct. 1958).
411d. at 841, 173 N.Y.S2d at 128.
42178 N.Y.S2d 746 (Ct Spec. Sess. 1958).
43 9 Misc. 2d 745, 169 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1957).
44 See note 35 mipra.
4 See People v. Burnes, 178 N.Y.S.2d 746 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1958); People v.
McCormack, 9 Misc. 2d 745, 169 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1957); cf. State
v. Norris, 82 Ore. 680, 162 Pac. 859 (1917); Smith v. Mitchell, 64 Cal. App. 463,
467, 221 Pac. 964, 966 (Dist. Ct. App. 1923); Nash v. Douglass, 12 Ab. Pr. (n.s.)
187, 190 (Brooklyn, N.Y., City Ct. 1872).
46 CAL. PEN. CODE §647(d); MODEL PENAL CODE §251.3 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962); RI. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-34-5 (1957). Criminality is also fixed at
an early stage by D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2701 (1961) ("address for the purpose of").
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assemblages of homosexuals in public places. 47 Although a defendant's
initiating communication of willingness should satisfy these statutes, respon-
sive conduct is inconclusive 48 and should not support a conviction absent an
outright confession of purpose.4 9
3. Attempts
Unlike nuisance and breach of the peace solicitations, the existence of
an attempt is determined by its relation to the consummate crime, and not
by a comparison of the conduct in question with normal behavior. Attempts
are punished because they indicate an intention to commit a more con-
summate crime which may succeed in the future.50 However, in cases
involving clear verbal propositions of intercourse to girls under the age
of consent, courts have not followed this rationale, but have required
further acts with intent to commit the consummate crime.51 Even overt
acts have been held not to constitute attempts -2 unless the actor, intending
to commit the specific crime at the immediate time and place, indecently
touched the victim 53 or indecently exposed himself.M The only case which
held that a clear overture to sodomy was not an attempt did not consider the
solicitation an overt act.55 Nevertheless, in one case solicitation to sodomy
was held to be attempted sodomy when the defendant urged the solicitee
to join in an offense to be committed almost as soon as the two of them
could reach the appointed place.56 Under these circumstances, the solicita-
tion is a substantial step toward the commission of the crime and is so
strongly corroborative of the defendant's purpose and of his willingness to
47 Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669,
683 (1963).
48 But cf., People v. Lynn, 307 N.Y. 683, 120 N.E.2d 855 (1954) (per curiam);
People v. Hansuld, 114 N.Y.S.2d 243, 246-47 (Magis. Ct 1952).
49 Responsive conduct may have probative weight if evidence of prior offenses
is admissible. See text accompanying notes 177, 179-80 infra; Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369, 375-76 (1958) ; 44 IowA L. Rzv. 578, 586-87 (1959).
50 Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 26, at 572.
51 Cox v. People, 82 Ill. 191 (1876) ; State v. Frazier, 53 Kan. 87, 90-91, 36 Pac.
58, 59 (1894) (dictum) (attempted rape, no discussion of facts); In the Matter of
Lloyd, 51 Kan. 501, 502, 33 Pac. 307, 308 (1893) (same); Clinkscales v. State, 46
Okla. Crim. 29, 288 Pac. 348 (1930) (alternative holding) (court confused attempted
rape with assault with intent to rape). Other cases have reached this result on the
theory that a solicitation alone is never an attempt. State v. Roby, 194 Iowa 1032,
1042, 188 N.W. 709, 714 (1922) (dictum); State v. Harney, 101 Mo. 470, 14 S.W.
657 (1890) (defendant not only solicited but went with victim to the appointed place).
52 See Mullins v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 477, 5 S.E.2d 491 (1939); Cromeans
v. State, 59 Tex. Crim. 611, 613-14, 129 S.W. 1129, 1134-35 (1909).
5 Hutto v. State, 169 Ala. 19, 53 So. 809 (1910) ; State v. Smith, 14 Del. (9
Houst.) 588, 33 Atl. 441 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1892); State v. Pepka, 72 S.D. 503, 37
N.W.2d 189 (1949) ; State v. Tomblin, 124 W. Va. 264, 20 S.E.2d 122 (1942).
54 Payne v. Commonwealth, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 229, 110 S.W. 311 (Ct. App. 1908).
55 State v. Bereman, 177 Kan. 141, 276 P.2d 364 (1954) (no facts stated in
opinion).
56 King v. Barker, [1924] N.Z.L.R. 865 (Ct. App.).
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act that there can be little question about his dangerousness. 57 Judicial
reluctance to sustain an attempt conviction on ambiguous language 58 might
be overcome by requiring a clearer statement of purpose instead of having
a blanket rule that solicitation does not constitute an attempt at sodomy.59
In fact, less clarity might be required for homosexual as opposed to
heterosexual attempts, since homosexual overtures are seldom made to adult
strangers without serious intent.
Since homosexual overtures are often directed to those who the actor
thinks will be sympathetic, any clear communication of willingness should
be sufficient without requiring a separately identifiable element of im-
portunity. Perhaps the appointment of a place to perform the consummate
offense is not even necessary; 60 clear language should be sufficiently cor-
roborative of purpose. Indeed, the defendant might not have a place
available for the commission of the offense but might be waiting for the
other person to suggest one.61
Since the danger at which the attempt statute is directed refers to the
likelihood of future unlawful conduct of the same nature as that attempted,
the solicitee who actively participates in the preparations to commit the
consummate crime should also be guilty of an attempt. On the other hand,
a willing solicitee's mere agreement to the proposals of the solicitor is too
equivocal to indicate sufficient predisposition on his part to commit further
unlawful acts.
B. Importunity
Another consideration underlying the proscription of homosexual
communications is that they may tend to provoke breaches of the peace.
Section 722(8) of the New York Penal Law expresses such a purpose.
It provides:
Any person who with intent to provoke a breach of the peace,
or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any
of the following acts shall be deemed to have committed the offense
of disorderly conduct: . . .
8. Frequents or loiters about any public place soliciting men
for the purpose of committing a crime against nature or other
lewdness .... 62
M Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §5.02, comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960)
with id. § 5.01 and Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 26, at 572.
58 Smith v. Commonwealth, 54 Pa. 209 (1867); King v. Moore, [1936] N.Z.
L.R. 979 (Ct. App.).
59 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.02, comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
o But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (2) (b) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
61 However, the requirement that there be an appointed place may protect the
homosexual "phantasizer" who never intended to commit the offense, but who derives
satisfaction from the solicitation alone. See Field Study 14; Commonwealth v. Krout,
17 Pa. D. & C.2d 795 (Quarter Sess. 1957). Of course, this kind of offender violates
those statutes directed at the annoying aspects of homosexual overtures.
62 N.Y. PEN. LAw § 722(8).
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Requiring an intent to provoke a breach of the peace seems unrealistic
and superfluous, since no solicitor desires a disturbance.6 This require-
ment has been treated in various ways by the courts. Some have ignored
it; 6 4 some have presumed it,65 thereby rendering the breach of the peace
language superfluous; and others inquire whether a given solicitation
threatens a disturbance. 6 If a court takes the third approach, a separately
identifiable element of importunity or persistent urging appears necessary,
since mere expressions of willingness are unlikely to provoke disruptive,
retaliatory action.
67
C. Touchings and Threats Thereof
Homosexual overtures may go beyond mere communications to pro-
posed or actual touching. Touching might violate a nuisance-type statute
directed at lewd acts in public places.18 Courts have also recognized that
touchings can constitute an assault,69 since assault relates to both the
psychic and the physical security of the victim. 70  An offer to touch, as well
as actual contact, subjects the victim to fear and humiliation. Moreover,
although assault with intent to commit sodomy requires specific intent,
71
touchings or threats thereof might also constitute that offense since intent
may be inferred from defendant's words and acts.72 However, if the de-
3 See People v. Evans, 19 Misc. 2d 1071, 192 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Ct. Spec. Sess.
1959), rev'd without opinion, 7 N.Y.2d 1030, 166 N.E.2d 861, 200 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1960) ;
People v. Feliciano, 10 Misc. 2d 836, 173 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Magis. Ct. 1958); cf. People
v. Harrison, 11 Misc. 2d 445, 447, 173 N.Y.S.2d 128, 131 (Magis. Ct. 1958).
64 See People v. Burnes, 178 N.Y.S.2d 746 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1958); People v.
McCormack, 9 Misc. 2d 745, 169 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1957).
65 See People v. Pleasant, 23 Misc. 2d 367, 122 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Magis. Ct. 1953);
People v. Humphrey, 111 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Broome County Ct. 1952).
66 People v. Evans, 19 Misc. 2d 1071, 192 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Ct Spec. Sess. 1959),
rev'd without opinion, 7 N.Y.2d 1030, 166 N.E.2d 861, 200 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1960);
People v. Feliciano, 10 Misc. 2d 836, 173 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Magis. Ct. 1958); People v.
Strauss, 114 N.Y.S.2d 322 (Magis. Ct. 1952).
67 Breach of the peace in § 722(8) means to provoke violent reaction or to disturb,
embarrass, or alarm, rather than merely to annoy. Compare People v. Strauss, 114
N.Y.S.2d 322, 324 (Magis. Ct. 1955), with People v. Rabey, 48 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Broome
County Ct. 1944). See People v. Harrison, 11 Misc. 2d 445, 447, 173 N.Y.S.2d 128,
131 (Magis. Ct. 1958).
68 Compare Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUm.
L. Rxv. 669, 671-72 (1963), with Perkins, An Analysis of Assault and Attempts To
Assault, 47 MINN. L. Rxv. 71, 75, 88-89 (1962).
69 See Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Goodman v.
United States, 118 A.2d 517 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1955); Henderson v. United
States, 117 A.2d 456 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1955) ; McDermett v. United States, 98
A.2d 287 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953); Dyson v. United States, 97 A.2d 135 (D.C.
Munic. Ct. App. 1953); Levy v. State, 69 Ga. App. 265, 25 S.E.2d 153 (1943).
70 MAY, LAw Or CRIMES 261 (4th ed. 1938) ; see PERINrs, CRIMINAL LAW 673-74
(1957); CIARE & MARSHALL, CRImEs 651 (6th ed. 1958).
71 PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 674 (1957) ; 24 TENN. L. Rxv. 383 (1956) ; ef. MAY,
op. cit. supra note 70, at 190.
72 However, if the charge is assault with intent to commit a felony which does
not embrace all forms of homosexual intercourse, the defendant must specifically
intend to commit the particular felony. See People v. Goldstein, 146 Cal. App. 2d
268, 274-75, 303 P.2d 892, 896 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (attempt to commit oral copu-
lation) ; State v. Ficklin, 190 Wash. 168, 172, 67 P.2d 897, 899, aff'd on other grounds,
192 Wash. 575, 74 P2d 187 (1937) (attempt to commit oral copulation).
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fendant makes adequately suggestive remarks and touches the private parts
of the victim or threatens to do so, this should be sufficient to constitute
an attempt.73 The addition of a touching would make out an even stronger
case than would the solicitation alone.
II. DEFENSES ARISING FROM THE DECOY SITUATION
The subtle manner in which homosexual overtures are made and the
need to clarify ambiguous approaches suggest that responsiveness on the
part of the decoy is often necessary to secure conviction. Even if the
decoy does nothing, the defendant may deny any wrong because policemen
as decoys are not themselves harmed by the alleged criminal behavior;
and when the police decoy acts affirmatively the defendant may claim that
the decoy's activities contravene public policy.
A. Lack of an Element of the Offense
Although a particular criminal statute may explicitly describe the
elements necessary to constitute the offense, the statute's purpose often
determines the scope of the prohibited conduct.
1. Apparent Consent
a. Assault
In McDermett v. United States,74 the defendant committed an act of
onanism in the men's room of a motion picture theatre and then began
a conversation with a plainclothesman who had observed him. The officer
left the men's room and waited outside the theatre for the defendant to
appear. The officer then followed the defendant who resumed the con-
versation. The men circled three blocks while they talked. The officer
informed the defendant that he was staying at a particular hotel, and as
he entered, the defendant went with him. When the officer reached the
men's room on the first floor and stood before a urinal, the defendant
came alongside, began to masturbate, and then touched the officer's
genitals.75 In Guarro v. United States,76 the defendant and the plain-
clothesman also noticed each other in a motion picture theatre. Both went
to the balcony where the officer looked at the defendant, left, and lounged
on the stairs for three or four minutes with his coat open. The defendant
approached and asked the officer why he was not watching the picture.
When the officer replied that it was too noisy, the defendant touched his
clothed private parts.77  The courts in both McDermett and Guarro re-
73 CoLo. REV. STAT. AN. § 40-915 (1953) ; GA. CoDE AN. § 26-6101 (1953).
74 98 A.2d 287 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953).
75 Id. at 288.
76237 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
77 Id. at 581-82.
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versed convictions because they found that the policemen had manifested
consent by indicating a homosexual willingness.
78
In McDermett and Guarro the courts assumed that lack of consent
was necessary to establish the particular assaults, yet, like the usual
assault statute,79 the statute in those cases made no reference to consent.80
Legislatures have adopted the common-law crime of assault without clari-
fying its precise limits,sl and have left to the courts the determination of
the extent to which consent vitiates the offense. As the court's emphasis
on apparent consent in Guarro 82 suggests, in the absence of any superior
societal interest 83 the law is concerned primarily with the defendant's
propensity to inflict harm upon the physical and psychic security of the
public. 4 If the defendant acts only when he reasonably believes the victim
is willing, there is no propensity to inflict unwanted individual injury.85
However, courts have recognized a superior societal interest and have
refused to permit consent to vitiate an assault when great violence8 " or
the presence of assembled crowds 87 creates a breach of the peace risk,88
or when there is serious bodily harm. 9 And in dictum one court declared
that the defendant's conduct was so immoral that it ought to be punished
78 Id. at 581; 98 A.2d at 289-90.
7 9 E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4708 (1945).
8 0 D.C. CoDE ANN. § 22-504 (1961).
81 See Beausoliel v. United States, 107 F.2d 292, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1939). See
generally Perkins, An Analysis of Assault and Attempts To Assault, 47 MINN. L.
Rv. 71 (1962).
82 237 F.2d at 581-82.
83 See Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HALv. L. REv.
748, 766 (1935); Hughes, Consent as a Defence in Criminal Law, 103 LAW J. 116
(1953); Hughes, Consent in Sexual Offense, 25 MODERN L. REv. 672 (1962); 33
CAN. B. Rxv. 88 (1955).
84 See Schwartz, supra note 68, at 671-72.
85 There is a basis to believe the victim is willing only if the victim's conduct is
unequivocal, since the misconstruction of equivocal but innocent conduct indicates the
defendant's propensity to inflict unwanted injury.
86 ueen v. Coney, 8 Q.B.D. 534, 548-49 (1882) (Stephen, 3.) (alternative hold-
ing) ; see Commonwealth v. Colberg, 119 Mass. 350 (1876).
s7 Queen v. Coney, supra note 86, at 552, 553-54 (Hawkins, J.); see State v.
Burnham, 56 Vt. 445, 447 (1884).
88 See MAY, op. cit. upra note 70, at 252-53; MLLER, CRIMINAL LAw 173 (1934);
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 83 (1957) ; Hughes, Consent in Sexual Offenses, 25 MoDEMN
L. REv. 672, 674, 676-77 (1962) ; Puttkammer, Consent in Criminal Assault, 19 ILL.
L. ,Zyv. 617 & n.2 (1925). But see Champer v. State, 14 Ohio St. 437 (1863).
89 Commonwealth v. Farrell, 322 Mass. 606, 78 N.E.2d 697 (1948); King v.
Donovan, 11934] 2 K.B. 498 (dictum) ; Queen v. Coney, 8 Q.B.D. 534, 548-49 (1882)
(Stephen, J.) (alternative holding); PERINs, CRIMINAL LAw 83 (1957); Hughes,
supra note 88, at 674, 676. The emphasis on serious bodily harm may result from
society's concern for the loss of the victim's services and the risk that the victim will
become a public charge, fear that the actor may become addicted to his practice and
attack those who do not consent, and lingering doubts that there was full and free
consent. See Hughes, Morals and the Criminal Law, 71 YALE L.J. 662, 670-77 (1962).
Another factor is paternalistic protection of the victim from his own indiscretions.
See HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 30-32 (1963); Beale, Consent in Criminal
Law, 8 HARv. L. REv. 317, 325 (1895).
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regardless of consent.90  The courts in McDermett and Guarro did not
find such a superior moral interest.
Had McDermett and Guarro been charged with assault with intent
to commit sodomy, a different result might have been reached on the issue
of consent. Arguably the legislative intent would be to reach sodomy at an
earlier stage, and since consent is no defense to sodomy, it perhaps should
not vitiate an assault which the legislature has linked to sodomy.91 How-
ever, this broad construction 92 ignores the use in the statute of the word
"assault" which includes in its legal definition lack of consent.0
b. Nuisance Offenses
Since statutes proscribing lewd acts in public places are intended to
prevent nuisances to the public, a defendant might argue that he does not
violate such a statute if he touches or makes gestures only at one whom
he reasonably believes will not take offense. Nevertheless, the defendant's
limited objective does not vitiate the offense because uninvolved third
persons still might see the activity,94 and the defendant's choice of a public
place for his actions displays indifference to possible unpleasantness he
-0 See State v. Chicorelli, 129 Conn. 601, 30 A.2d 544 (1943) (dictum) ; cf. Devlin,
The Enforcement of Morals, 45 PROCFEINGs BRIT. ACADEMY 129, 133-34 (1959):
Whether the consent of the victim to a crime shall be a defense is a question
of morals. It cannot be a question of physical injury to society; that is
impossible. Nor is it a question of shock, corruption or exploitation; every-
thing may be in private. Nor can it be that the defendant is a dangerous
man against whom the rest of the community must be protected; the defendant
who acts on the victim's consent is no menace to others. It must be that
this is wrong because it transgresses one of the standards of behavior or moral
principles which society requires to be observed ....
91 Cf. State v. Roby, 194 Iowa 1032, 188 N.W. 709 (1922) (assault with intent
to rape child incapable of consenting) ; People v. Lipski, 328 Mich. 194, 43 N.W.2d
325 (1959) (semble) (assault with intent to commit adultery); Liebscher v. State,
69 Neb. 395, 95 N.W. 870 (1903) (assualt with intent to rape child incapable of con-
sent) ; People v. Gibson, 232 N.Y. 458, 134 N.E. 531 (1922) (alternative holding)
("lewd" assault on girl below age of consent for lewd fondling and carressing);
Cromeans v. State, 59 Tex. Crim. 611, 613-14, 129 S.W. 1129, 1132-33 (1909) (same) ;
Ross v. State, 16 Wyo. 285, 299, 93 Pac. 299, 303 (1907) (same) ; Regina v. B. & L.,
71 Weekly N. (N.S.W.) 138 (Crim. App. 1954) (statute explicitly making indecent
assault a crime without regard to consent did not require that the prosecution prove
compulsion, threats, or hostility) ; 4 WAYNE L. REV. 175 (1958). But see People v.
Dong Pok Yip, 164 Cal. 143, 127 Pac. 1031 (1912) (simple assault) ; People v. Hickey,
109 Cal. 275, 41 Pac. 1027 (1895) (same); cf. Taylor v. State, 214 Md. 156, 163,
164-68, 133 A.2d 414, 417, 418-19 (1957) (dissenting opinion) (assault with intent to
commit sodomy) ; State v. Pickett, 11 Nev. 255 (1876) (assault with intent to rape
child incapable of consent); Commonwealth v. Miller, 80 Pa. Super. 309 (1923)
(same) ; Hughes, Consent in Sexual Offenses, 25 MoDEN_ L. REv. 672, 677 n.18 (1962).
92 A broad construction of an assault with intent statute is more reasonable when
the legislature links assault to a particular felony, as in a statute proscribing assault
with intent to commit sodomy, than when it generally proscribes assault with intent
to commit a felony, and declares sodomy or the like a felony in another statute.
Compare ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 38 (1940) and CAL. PEN. CODE § 220 with MicH. Com.
LAvs § 750.87 (1948).
93 However, if the legislature specifically condemns homosexual touchings, see
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-652 (1956); M Ic. CoarI. LAws § 750.338 (1948), it is
easier to hold that consent is no defense even if the legislature has not specifically
declared consent irrelevant.
94 See 70 YALE L.J. 623, 624 & n.11 (1961).
270 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112:259
might cause others. The same reasoning does not necessarily apply to
verbal communications, since there is less risk that unintended persons
will overhear subdued conversation. 5 In these cases the courts should
evaluate the risk in each case, unless the statute prohibits loitering" 6 and
thereby seeks to protect the public against the visually annoying aspect
of assemblages of homosexuals.9 7
c. Breaches of the Peace
The breach of the peace language in section 722(8) of the New York
Penal Law 98 has been interpreted to require solicitations which cause or
have a tendency to cause violent reactions on the part of the person to
whom the solicitation is addressed.99 Therefore, if the defendant acts only
when the decoy has led him reasonably to believe that there is consent, his
conduct neither indicates a propensity to disturb others in the future, nor
constitutes a breach of the peace, since the officer's duty is to arrest the
defendant rather than to retaliate physically.10  However, if this statute
also covers conduct which might provoke breaches of the peace on the
part of third party observers, its applicability to a consensual situation is
similar to that of the nuisance solicitation statute. A distinction should then
be drawn between communications which contain a risk of being witnessed
by third parties, such as physical touchings, and those which contain
virtually no risk, such as subdued conversation.
2. The Decoy as "Victim"
Although the decoy's consent may take the defendant's conduct out of
the reach of a particular statute, the mere fact that the victim is a decoy
should not have a similar effect since it is unrelated to the dangerousness
of the defendant.
Section 722(8) of the New York Penal Law prohibits soliciting
"whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned." 101 In People v.
Pleasant, a magistrates' court held that since this language referred to
95 See Morris v. District of Columbia, 31 A.2d 652 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1943)
(semble) (previous acquaintance between parties relevant); People v. Yergan, 164
Misc. 83, 299 N.Y. Supp. 248 (Magis. Ct. 1937) (dictum) (same); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 251.3, status note (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Cf. People v. Feliciano,
10 Misc. 2d 836, 841, 173 N.Y.S.2d 123, 128 (Magis. Ct. 1958) (alternative holding) ;
People v. Harrison, 11 Misc. 2d 445, 448, 173 N.Y.S.2d 128, 130-31 (Magis. Ct. 1958).
Compare Horton v. Mead, [1913] 1 K.B. 154.
96 CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(d); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-34-5 (1956); MODEL
PENAL CODE § 251.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5(4)
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
97 Schwartz, Morals Offewses and the Model Penal Code, 63 CoLtum. L. Rxv.
669, 675 (1963) ; see MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3, status note at 237 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962).
98 See text accompanying note 62 supra.
99 See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
"O Cf. People v. Feliciano, 10 Misc. 2d 836, 173 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Magis. Ct. 1958).
101 Cf. text accompanying notes 63-67 supra.
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behavior which tends to cause a breach of the peace, the fact that the
solicitation had been addressed to a plainclothesman was irrelevant.10 2
However, in People v. Feliciano another magistrates' court decided that
there could be no breach of the peace because the police officer to whom
defendant addressed the solicitation had a duty to maintain the public
order.103 Yet, it is defendant's conduct and the reaction of the ordinary
person which should be determinative of any tendency to provoke a breach
of the peace, not the reaction of a decoy-"victim."
A municipal court in the District of Columbia construing an assault
statute reached a conclusion similar to Pleasant. In Dyson v. United
States,0 4 the defendant touched the clothed private parts of a plainclothes-
man. The court recognized that this conduct was an assault if the victim
suffered fear, shame, or humiliation, 0 5 but the defendant claimed that the
victim suffered no injury because he was a case-hardened police officer
who had occasion to deal with sexual perverts.'0 6 The court held that
the victim's identity as a police officer was irrelevant, since the defendant
did not know it at the time of the offense, and the same act when directed
at the ordinary person would arouse fear, shame, or humiliation. 0 7 This
rationale is also applicable to offenses under statutes which prohibit com-
munications in order to avoid public nuisances. Similarly, in attempts and
in communication offenses in which the legislative purpose is to punish
those with a propensity to commit more consummate crime, the fact that
the victim's identity prevents completion of the attempt has no bearing
on defendant's chances of future success. 108
.02 23 Misc. 2d 367, 371-72, 122 N.Y.S.2d 141, 144 (Magis. Ct. 1953).
103 People v. Feliciano, 10 Misc. 2d 836, 173 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Magis. Ct. 1953)
(alternative holding).
104 97 A.2d 135 (D.C. Miunic. Ct. App. 1953).
1O5 Id. at 136; accord, Beausoliel v. United States, 107 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1939);
Clancy v. State, 93 Tex. Crim. 380, 247 S.W. 865 (1923); Hawes v. State, 44 S.W.
1094 (Tex. Crim. App. 1898); MODEL PIAL CODE § 207.6, comment at 292 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955); PERKINS, CIMINAL LAw 80 .(1957).
106Accord, McKenna, Criminal Law, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 141, 144-45 (1954).
107 97 A.2d at 136-37; accord, Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578, 580-81
(D.C. Cir. 1956).
108 Traditionally, the law has distinguished between attempts which are legally
impossible and those which are factually impossible. The former vitiates the attempt
and the latter does not. See, e.g., PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 494 (1957). Legal im-
possibility occurs when the defendant's ultimate objective, if completed, would not
have constituted a crime, even though he thought that it would. Factual impossibility
occurs when the purpose of the defendant to accomplish a crime becomes frustrated
by some extrinsic circumstance unknown to him. See, e.g., Smith, Two Problems in
Criminal Attempts Re-examined, 1962 CRIM. L. .Ev. (Eng.) 212-22. In decoy cases,
factual impossibility results when a decoy, who purports to go along with the defend-
ant, never really intends to consummate the crime. The extrinsic circumstance is
the unwillingness of the decoy. See People v. Gardner, 144 N.Y. 119, 38 N.E. 1003
(1894) ; cf. State v. Mandel, 78 Ariz. 226, 278 P.2d 413 (1954) ; People v. Siu, 126
Cal. App. 2d 41, 271 P.2d 575 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954) ; People v. Lanzit, 70 Cal. App.
498, 233 Pac. 816 (Dist. Ct. App. 1925); People v. Heinrich, 65 Cal. App. 510,
224 Pac. 466 (Dist. Ct. App. 1924). The legal-factual impossibility analysis over-
looks the actor's own mental frame of reference, which is the most relevant indi-
cator of his dangerous potential. See Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of
Inchoate Crimes i the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt,
Solicitation, and Compiracy, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 571, 578-79 (1961).
19631
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B. Entrapment
In other areas in which decoys have been used, the prosecution may
prove every element of the offense charged, and yet the decoy's conduct
may prevent conviction because it constitutes an entrapment. The doctrine
of entrapment reflects a policy that the powers of government should not
be used to instigate otherwise innocent persons to commit crimes which
they would not commit on their own.10 9 These persons are situational
rather than chronic offenders. 110 Courts classically implement the entrap-
ment policy by ascertaining, in each instance, the defendant's "predisposi-
tion" to commit the offense and the degree of persuasion or enticement
offered by the decoy."'
These criteria of entrapment suggest the necessity to examine the
conduct of both the decoy and the defendant to determine whether the
offense was the "product of the creative activity" 112 of the police. The
defendant's prior record of convictions and his bad reputation are relevant
factors in this examination."13 Even if the police activity excessively in-
duced the defendant, he will not be exonerated if the prosecution can
show a predisposition to commit the crime.114 However, bad reputation
evidence to establish predisposition has been challenged as unreliable, 1 5 and
the admissibility of both bad reputation evidence and prior offenses involves
a risk that the jury will convict the defendant on the basis of his former
behavior.116
Although in some areas courts have treated the defendant's reactions
to the decoy's suggestions as indicative of whether the defendant was
109 See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932). Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
110 Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons and Agents
Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1113 (1951).
311 See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958).
112 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
113 Donnelly, supra note 110, at 1102. Reputation evidence is generally allowed
on the theory that it establishes reasonable grounds for the policemen's suspicion.
See, e.g., Whiting v. United States, 296 F.2d 512 (1st Cir. 1961) ; Heath v. United
States, 169 F.2d 1007, 1010 (10th Cir. 1948) ; Fisk v. United States, 279 Fed. 12, 17-18
(6th Cir. 1922). Contra, United States v. Washington, 20 F.2d 160, 162 (D. Neb.
1927) (dictum).
114 See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
115 See 51 GEo. L.J. 190, 195 (1962). Courts are beginning to circumscribe the
admissibility of reputation evidence. See United States v. Collier, 317 F.2d 157 (7th
Cir. 1963) (general reputation inadmissible) ; cf. Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d
219 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (uncorroborated police testimony of alleged prior offense).
116 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382-83 (1958) (concurring opinion);
Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219, 223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (dictum) ; Note,
73 HARv. L. REv. 1333, 1339 (1960) ; 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1033, 1038 (1958) ; 70 YALE
L.J. 623, 633-34 (1961). Removal of the entire question from the jury might alleviate
the underlying problem. See Cowen, The Entrapment Doctrine in the Federal Courts,
and Some State Court Comparisons, 49 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 447, 452-53 (1959).
Some courts, however, in cases involving sex crimes, have permitted the prose-
cution to introduce evidence of prior similar crimes or acts to show the probability
that the defendant committed the crime. See, e.g., State v. McDaniel, 80 Ariz. 381,
388, 298 P.2d 798, 802 (1956) (alternative holding) ; Dyson v. United States, 97 A.2d
135 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953) ; Commonwealth v. Kline, 361 Pa. 434, 65 A.2d 348
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"otherwise innocent," 11 this criterion does not help to distinguish the
situational from the chronic homosexual offender. The former may
eagerly accede during a period of emotional stress,1 18 whereas the latter
may show reluctance due to his greater wariness of "hustlers" who may
beat and rob him, blackmailers, and police decoys.,, Furthermore, any
nervousness in the defendant may be due either to the sexual excitement
of the experienced offender or to the unfamiliarity and hesitancy of the
novice.'2 0
Similar difficulties invalidate the usual criterion used to determine
whether police enticement was a catalyst to an "otherwise innocent" de-
fendant. Ordinarily any appeal based on incentives other than pecuniary
gain will lure the situational rather than the chronic offender.12 ' This
criterion is inapplicable in homosexual offenses since both chronic and
situational offenders act upon easily tempted impulses.'2 2 The uncon-
trollable quality of the homosexual impulse suggests a special standard
for evaluating police conduct in that context. If the policeman initially
encouraged the defendant by a clear expression of willingness,'23 since
this encouragement is an improper inducement, the prosecution should
have to overcome 24 the entrapment defense by proof that the defendant's
(1949). But see, e.g., State v. Atkinson, 293 S.W.2d 941 (Mo. 1956) ; State v. Start,
65 Ore. 178, 132 Pac. 512 (1913); Young v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 164, 261 S.W.2d
836 (1953). This approach is opposed to the traditional view that the probable
prejudicial effect outweighs the aid to conviction. See McCoRMIcK, EVIDENcE § 157,
at 327 (1954). See generally Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in
Theory, 5 VAND. L. RPv. 385, 408-09 (1952) ; Note, 40 MINN. L. REV. 694 (1956) ;
39 CALIF. L. Rxv. 584 (1951); 23 TEi. L.Q. 133 (1949); 98 U. PA. L. REv. 116
(1949); 9 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 86 (1952).
"17 See United States v. Masciale, 236 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1956), aff'd, 356 U.S.
386 (1958) ; People v. Head, 208 Cal. App. 2d 399, 25 Cal. Rptr. 124, 128 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1962); People v. Williams, 237 N.Y.S.2d 527, 534 (Oneida County Ct. 1963).
118 70 YALE L.J. 623, 633 (1961).
119 Id. at 633.
120 Ibid.
121 United States v. Washington, 20 F.2d 160, 163 (D. Neb. 1927) (dictum);
Note, 73 HtAv. L. REv. 1333, 1335-36 (1960); 70 YALE L.J. 623, 633 (1961); see
Note, 31 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 262, 265 (1957).
12 70 YALE L.J. 623, 633 & n.81 (1961) ; see HomOsExuALiTY, A CROss-CuLTURAL
APPROACH 400 (Corey ed. 1956) ; PLoscowE, SEX AND THE LAW 212-13 (1951) ; cf.
Johnson v. United States, 317 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (defendant entitled to submit
entrapment to jury when he might have been motivated by the hope of a reward of
narcotics) ; United States v. Silva, 180 F. Supp. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (by implication)
(excessive inducement to offer drugs to addict in great physical need) ; United States
v. Echols, 253 Fed. 862 (S.D. Tex. 1918) (any offer to intoxicated defendant is
entrapment per se) ; People v. Hall, 25 Ill. 2d 297, 301, 185 N.E.2d 143, 145 (1962)
(dictum) (offer of drugs to addict in great physical need) ; People v. Gallagher, 107
Cal. App. 425, 290 Pac. 504 (Dist. Ct. App. 1930) (semble) (addict accused of buying
small quantity of narcotics entitled to entrapment instruction even though informer's
persuasion was slight).
123 See 70 YALE L.J. 623, 634 (1961).
'24 The defendant has the burden of persuasion that there was an improper induce-
ment. Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641, 652-54 (1st Cir. 1963) ; Note, 73 HARv.
L. REv. 1333, 1344 (1960) ; see United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882-83 (2d
Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Markham, 191 F.2d 936, 937-38 (7th Cir. 1951) ; People
1963]
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conduct immediately preceding the inducement indicated willingness to
commit the offense regardless of the decoy's conduct.
An alternative entrapment formula was advocated in the separate
opinion in Sorrells v. United States '25 and repeated in the concurring
opinion in Sherman v. United States.12 6 This formula states that courts
should not sanction police practices which fall beneath the "standards, to
which common feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental power."
Accordingly, the focus is upon the practices of the police and not upon
the status of the defendant; the result is a prophylactic rule which exon-
erates the defendant regardless of whether the defendant's history or
reaction to the enticement shows a predisposition to commit the crime.'2 7
The sole inquiry is whether the particular police conduct would induce
only those likely to commit the crime on their own, and the setting in
which the inducement took place becomes highly significant.12 8  If this
standard were applied to the homosexual decoy case, activity or passivity
of the police officer would be the criterion since any initiating encourage-
ment creates substantial risks of inducing the situational offender.'2 9 How-
ever, the officer's activity would be judged in light of the defendant's im-
v. Benson, 206 Cal. App. 2d 519, 532, 23 Cal. Rptr. 908, 916 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963); People v. Grijalva, 48 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694, 121
P.2d 32, 34 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941); People v. Lee, 9 Cal. App. 2d 99, 109-10, 48 P.2d
1003, 1007-08 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, comment at 20-21
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). But see Ryles v. United States, 183 F.2d 944, 945-46
(10th Cir. 1950). If the defendant meets this burden, entrapment is established unless
the prosecution is able to show that the defendant was predisposed to commit the
crime. Note, 73 H.v. L. REv. 1333, 1344 (1960) ; see Gorin v. United States, supra
at 652-54; United States v. Sherman, supra at 882-83.
M25 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932) (separate opinion).
'26356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Although no court
has adopted this formula in an actual holding, some have suggested a preference for it.
See Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962); McDermett v. United
States, 98 A.2d 287, 290 & n.6 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953); cf. United States v.
Millpax, Inc., 313 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1963); Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d
441 (5th Cir. 1962). See generally MODEL PENAL CODE §2.10(2), comment at 20
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); Donnelly, supra note 110, at 1114; Comment, 9 Sw. L.J.
456, 460 (1955).
127 See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378, 382-83 (1958) (concurring
opinion) ; Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 458-59 (1932) (separate opinion);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, comment at 19-20 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
128 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378, 382-83 (1958) (concurring
opinion). Under this formulation, entrapment is generally a question for the judge,
since the court must preserve its processes from abuse. Id. at 385 (concurring opin-
ion) ; Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453, 457-58 (1932) (separate opinion) ;
Cowan, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, and Some State Court
Comparisons, 49 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 447, 452-53 (1959) ; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10,
comment at 21-22 (Tent Draft No. 9, 1959) ; see Williams, The Defense of Entrap-
ment and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28 Foan. L. REv. 399, 416-17
(1959). The court must also provide a guide for police conduct. Cowan, supra at
452-53. However, the Model Penal Code suggests that the issue should be tried
before a jury because it involves a determination of what might be too great a tempta-
tion for the ordinary citizen. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, comment at 22 (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1959). This consideration is not applicable to homosexual offenses, since the
jury would not know what temptations are too great for the ordinary situational
offender in this area.
129 See 70 YALE L.J. 623, 634 & n.90 (1961).
[Vol.l12:259
ENFORCEMENT OF HOMOSEXUAL LAWS
mediately preceding conduct since that would be part of the setting in
which the inducement took place.130
Since the general standard for an improper inducement under either
entrapment formula is the extent of the police officer's conduct expressing
willingness to engage in homosexual activity, the accused has a defense
if the officer consented to the solicitation of assault, or if the conduct of
the accused lacked the necessary quality required to constitute a solicita-
tion, attempt, or nuisance. However, entrapment is less helpful to the
defendant than a claim that a necessary element of the offense is lacking
because he must bear the burden of persuasion as to the improper induce-
ment, whereas initiative and unequivocal conduct, lack of consent, and
improper purpose are part of the prosecution's burden of persuasion. 13 1
When police decoys are used in homosexual overture cases, the de-
fendant's propensity to injure or disturb unwilling persons is the most
significant factor regardless of whether the defense is consent or entrap-
ment. However, the identity of the defense determines what conduct is
relevant to evaluate that propensity. The classic entrapment formula con-
siders the conduct of both the policeman and the defendant during the
episode, and the defendant's prior history, but the prophylactic entrapment
rule and the consent defense consider only the immediate conduct of the
policeman, and exclude the defendant's reaction to the police officer's in-
ducement or consent. However, the consent defenses in Guarro and
McDernmett present the question of whether consent exonerates the de-
fendant whenever the police officer demonstrates willingness prior to the
defendant's criminal act even if the defendant's conduct indicates that he
would, in any event, have engaged in the criminal acts. In this situation
the decoy's willingness is fortuitous, and the defendant has shown a
propensity to injure or disturb unwilling persons. Therefore, the consent
defense should not apply if the defendant's conduct indicated that he
would commit the offense regardless of the other party's willingness.
132
III. PROBLEMS OF PROOF
A. The Need for Special Caution
The court in Kelly v. United States '3 considered extensively the
practical problems of proof in homosexual decoy cases. Defendant had
been tried before a judge sitting without a jury and convicted of violating
130 See State v. Burnette, 242 N.C. 164, 87 S.E.2d 191 (1955) ; Ditton v. State,
222 Ind. 25, 51 N.E.2d 356 (1943) ; People v. Spaulding, 81 Cal. App. 615, 254 Pac.
614 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927).
13' See Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; McDermett
v. United States, 98 A.2d 287, 290 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953) ; Commonwealth v.
Shrodes, 354 Pa. 70, 74, 46 A.2d 483, 486 (1946).
If the courts continue to follow the classic entrapment formula, then a claim of
entrapment opens the door for evidence harmful to the defendant which might not
otherwise be admissible.
132 See 34 N.C.L. REv. 536, 541-45 (1956).
133 194 F,2d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
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a "lewd invitation" statute. 3 4 Although it was clear that on the evening
in question he conversed with a plainclothesman in a downtown park and
invited the plainclothesman to his apartment, the crucial issue in the case
was whether defendant had in fact proposed that they go to his apartment
for an act of perversion. 135 The only support for the charge was the
testimony of the decoy policeman.13 6 The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit recognized that particular care was required for the pro-
tection of the defendant because of the ease with which the accusation could
be made, the difficulty to disprove it, potential blackmail, and the injury to
the reputation of a person subjected to such an accusation. 3 7 At the
same time, the court was reluctant to impose rigid requirements of proof
which would make prosecutions under the statute virtually impossible. 38
Accordingly, it "counseled" the trial courts in terms of three governing
considerations. "[T] he testimony of a single witness to a verbal invitation
to sodomy should be received and considered with great caution . . ."
in order "that there be a known strictness . . . which will serve to deter
prosecutors in dubious cases." In addition, evidence of defendant's good
character which may tend to disprove homosexuality is important since
it may be the only defense other than the defendant's own testimony, and
may generate a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. Moreover, cor-
roboration should be necessary to establish the surrounding circumstances,
"such as presence at the alleged time and place." 1'9 The court then re-
versed the conviction for insufficient evidence. 14°
In subsequent cases, District of Columbia courts suggest that perhaps
the sodomitical nature of the offense rather than the use of police decoys
gave rise to the Kelly "counsels." In two cases the municipal court of
appeals has held that Kelly does not apply to decoy enforcement of the
offense of soliciting prostitution.141 But the counsels have been applied
134 "It shall not be lawful for any person to invite, entice, persuade, or to address
for the purpose of inviting, enticing or persuading any person . . . to accompany
. . . him or her . . . for the purpose of prostitution, or any other immoral or lewd
purpose . . . ." An Act To Provide for the Treatment of Sexual Psychopaths in
the District of Columbia, and for Other Purposes, ch. 428, § 102, 62 Stat. 346 (1948)
now D.C. CoDE ANN. § 22-2701 (1961)).
135 194 F.2d at 151-52, 155.
1 36 Ibid.
137 Id. at 154-55.
138 Id. at 154.
339 Id. at 154-55. Compare CAL. PEN. CODE § 653(f) (corroboration required
in prosecution for criminal solicitations); HAWAII REV. LAws §§ 248-49 (1955)
(same).
140 Compare Brenke v. United States, 78 A.2d 677 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1951)
(facts similar to Kelly; trier of fact can always believe prosecuting witness rather
than accused).
141 Parker v. United States, 143 A.2d 98 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1958) ; Price v.
United States, 135 A.2d 854 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1957). Kelly has been held in-
applicable in nonhomosexual and nonsodomitical cases when no decoy was used.
See McGhee v. District of Columbia, 137 A.2d 721 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1958)
(masturbation) ; Ingram v. United States, 110 A.2d 693 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1955)
(simple assault with heterosexual background). Although some cases imply that
Kelly applies to heterosexual offenses, they do so under limited circumstances. In
Goodsaid v. District of Columbia, 187 A.2d 486 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1963), the
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to cases of homosexual attempts,'4 proposals, 43 and assaults 144 when no
decoy was used, as well as to homosexual invitations to 145 and assaults
upon decoys.1 46  However the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in Kelly itself and in Guarro v. United States 14 7 applied
the counsels when the sole witness to the alleged criminal act was a
decoy.' 48 Moreover, in Goodsaid v. District of Columbia,149 the mu-
nicipal court of appeals was more willing to credit the testimony of a
complainant who "was not a plainclothes officer on the lookout to 'make
a case.' " 150
Other courts have been reluctant to require corroboration in sodomy
cases for the testimony of a complaining witness 151 or observing police
officer, 152 yet Kelly requires caution rather than' rigid corroboration 153
and applies to those offenses which are rarely seen by anyone except the
court applied Kelly to a situation in which a taxi driver was accused of making a
lewd proposal to his female passenger. The same situation occurred in Coleman v.
Godsey, 249 F.2d 522 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (per curiam) (appeal from revocation of taxi
driver's license; Kelly-type analysis applied without citing Kelly). These cases may
have taken into account the special susceptibility of taxi drivers to charges of this sort.
In Wilson v. United States, 271 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1959), Kelly was applied to indecent
liberties taken upon an eleven-year-old girl. Like a homosexual solicitation, this
conduct is "a phenomenon on the outer fringes of behavior." Kelly v. United States,
194 F.2d 150, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
142 United States v. Kelly, 119 F. Supp. 217 (D.D.C. 1954).
'43 Howard v. District of Columbia, 132 A.2d 150 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1957).
144 Konvalinka v. United States, 162 A.2d 778 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1960),
aff'd per curiam, 287 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
145 Wildeblood v. United States, 284 F. 2d 592, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (separate
opinion) ; Berneau v. United States, 188 A.2d 301 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1963);
Alexander v. United States, 187 A.2d 901 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1963); Bicksler v.
United States, 90 A.2d 233 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1952) ; King v. United States, 90
A.2d 229 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1952).
146 Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; see Seitner v.
United States, 143 A.2d 101 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App.), aff'd per curitam, 262 F.2d 710
(D.C. Cir. 1958). But see Dyson v. United States, 97 A.2d 135, 138 (D.C. Munic.
Ct. App. 1953) (dissenting opinion). In Guarro, the court recognized that the Kelly
rule applied both to assaults and to verbal communications since in an assault of this
nature there would ordinarily be no physical traces or other witnesses. 237 F.2d at
580. United States v. Kelly, 119 F. Supp. 217 (D.D.C. 1954), and Konvalinka v.
United States, 162 A.2d 778 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 287 F.2d
346 (D.C. Cir. 1961), assumed that Kelly applied to assaults and attempts without
such reasoning.
147 237 F.2d 578, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
148Ibid. Other cases have not done so in opinions which indicate that the point
was not even pressed. See Wildeblood v. United States, 284 F.2d 592, 598 (D.C. Cir.
1960) (separate opinion) ; Seitner v. United States, 143 A.2d 101 (D.C. Munic. Ct.
App.), aff'd per curiam, 262 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ; Bicksler v. United States,
90 A.2d 233 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1952) ; King v. United States, 90 A.2d 229 (D.C.
Munic. Ct. App. 1952).
149 187 A.2d 486 (D.C. Munic. Ct App. 1963).
150 Id. at 488.
15 1 E.g., People v. Troutman, 187 Cal. 313, 201 Pac. 928 (1921) ; Commonwealth
v. Allabaugh, 162 Pa. Super. 490, 58 A.2d 184 (1948).
152 E.g., People v. Sellers, 103 Cal. App. 2d 830, 230 P.2d 398 (Dist. Ct. App.
1951) ; People v. Bentley 102 Cal. App. 2d 97, 226 P.2d 669 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
35 3 In Reed v. United States, 93 A.2d 568 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953), vacated
as moot, id. at 570 (per curiam), the court required the minimal corroboration that the
defendant and the officer were present at the alleged time and place.
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"victim." 154 Those courts unwilling to adopt strict corroboration require-
ments, therefore, can still follow Kelly, particularly if they attach sig-
nificance to the sole witness' identity as a decoy policeman. Since no
existing doctrine seems to enable a court to attach special significance to
the decoy's testimony, 55 a special "rule" for homosexual cases seems
necessary. The development of a similar rule for hired informers and
"stool pigeons" whose testimony may be colored by their financial stake
in the conviction or by a promise of immunity has already begun.
56
Either subconsciously 15 7 or consciously a decoy policeman may
mistake the facts. Although unsuccessful prosecutions should not affect
his job security, they may enter into efficiency ratings and affect his chance
of promotion. 15  In addition, the policeman whose assignment is to find
homosexuals may have a distorted impression of the subtle interchange
which occurred, since he knows that he must fully justify his decision to
make an arrest.159  In some cases a policeman may deliberately "frame"
a homosexual for the purpose of blackmail 160 or simply because of malice.161
15 More consummate offenses may be evidenced by medical examination results,
see State v. Walhenmaier, 64 N.E.2d 148 (Ohio Ct App. 1945) (sodomy), or by the
testimony of eyewitnesses, see, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 119 F. Supp. 217 (D.D.C.
1954) (attempted sodomy); Commonwealth v. Donahue, 136 Pa. Super. 306, 7 A.2d
13 (1939) (sodomy).
155 For example, the decoy cannot be deemed an accomplice whose testimony may
require corroboration, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.04 (1947); TEX. CODE CRIm.
PRoc. art. 718 (1948), or particular caution, Freed v. United States, 266 Fed. 1021
(D.C. Cir. 1920); Williams, Corroboration-Accomplices, 1962 CRIm. L. REv. (Eng.)
588. But see, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495 (1916); United
States v. Becker, 62 F2d 1007, 1009 (2d Cir. 1933). The reasons underlying the
accomplice rule-that an accomplice may testify in a certain way in exchange for
immunity, 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2057 (3d ed. 1940) ; Williams, supra at 589, 591;
Note, 24 BROOKLYN L. REv. 324, 325 (1958), or because he desires revenge, Williams,
supra at 588; Note, 24 BROOKLYN L. REv. 324, 325 (1958), or wants to minimize his
own responsibility, Williams, supra at 588-are inapplicable to a decoy situation.
Texas follows the curious doctrine that entrapment requires corroboration of the
decoy's testimony, rather than acquittal of the defendant, because the decoy is then
considered an accomplice. See 9 Sw. L.J. 456, 466-71 (1955).
156 See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757 (1952) (dictum) ; Fisher v.
United States, 231 F.2d 99, 106 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Fletcher v. United States, 158 F.2d
321, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1946); United States v, Silva, 180 F. Supp. 557, 558 (S.D.N.Y.
1959) ; Donnelly, supra note 110, at 1120-21; Williams, supra note 155, at 408. But
see United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2d Cir. 1933) ; cf. United States v.
Troche, 213 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1954) ; United States v. On Lee, 201 F.2d 722 (2d Cir.
1953). Compare Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962) (con-
tingent fee decoy is dirty business).
157 See Kubie, Implications for Legal Procedure of the Fallibility of Human
Memory, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 59, 60, 61, 67 (1959).
158 Donnelly, supra note 110, at 1119-20.
159 See Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; Goodsaid
v. District of Columbia, 187 A.2d 486, 488 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1962) ; Field Study
30; cf. Love v. People, 160 Ill. 501, 505, 43 N.E. 710 (1896) (private detective). Com-
pare Field Study 23 (hostility of policemen to homosexual offenders).
160 See generally CORY, THE HOMOSEXUAL IN AMEICA 56, 433 (2d ed. 1960);
DEUTscn, THE TROUBLE WITH Cops 76, 88-89 (1955); MmEcE,, THEY WALK IN
SHADow 352 (1959) ; Fonzi, The Furtive Fraternity, Greater Philadelphia, Dec. 1962,
pp. 50-51; cf. State v. Mantes, 32 Idaho 724, 187 Pac. 268 (1920) ; 23 TUL. L. Ray.
399, 402 (1949) ; 14 WASH. & LEE L. Ray. 88, 95 (1957).
161 ACLU, 37TH ANN. REP. 78 (1957); cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, comment
at 14 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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Although courts often refuse to give the jury cautionary instructions about
decoy- testimony,162 homosexual invitation cases are unique because of the
possibility that the witness will misconstrue the implications of ambiguous
language and conduct.163 Therefore, a court reluctant to apply special
rules of caution either in a homosexual case or the ordinary decoy case
might be willing to apply cautionary counsel when confronted with a case
combining both a homosexual overture and a decoy. 1 4
B. Resolution of the Credibility Contest
After enunciating its three "counsels," the court in Kelly proceeded
to apply them to the case at hand. It found that defendant's evidence of
good character was impressive, that his explanation of his presence in the
park and participation in the conversation was reasonable, that he knew
his roommate was in the apartment at the time he allegedly invited the
officer, and that the testimony of the officer was contradicted in one
collateral respect by a disinterested witness. 165 Ultimately, the court
concluded that there was a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt and
reversed for insufficient evidence. 16
Later cases in the District of Columbia, although purporting to follow
Kelly, have refused to reverse for insufficient evidence even when there
was evidence of defendant's good character if his presence at the particular
time and place was corroborated. 167 Thus, the courts have reserved to
162 Compare Shettel v. United States, 113 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1940), and People
v. Gardt, 258 Ill. 468, 101 N.E. 687 (1913), and State v. Showen, 60 Mont. 474, 199
Pac. 917 (1921), and State v. Black, 121 N.C. 578, 28 S. E. 518 (1897), and State v.
Boner, 42 Wyo. 36, 288 Pac. 13 (1930), with On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747,
757 (1952) (dictum), and Borck v. State, 39 So. 580 (Ala. 1905) (dictum), and
State v. Showen, mspra at 479-80, 199 Pac. at 919-20 (concurring opinion), and Kast-
ner v. State, 58 Neb. 767, 79 N.W. 713 (1899), and State v. Love, 229 N.C. 99, 103-04,
47 S.E.2d 712, 715 (1948), and United States v. Phelps, 16 Philippine 410 (1900).
163 See Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Field
Study 30.
164 Because of possible prejudice, homosexual defendants often waive jury trial.
In such cases, although the cautionary counsels cannot be formalized in a jury charge,
they should be reflected in the attitude of the trial judge.
165 194 F.2d at 155-56. Compare James, Sufficiency of Evidence and Jury-Control
Devices Available Before Verdict, 47 V.- L. Rxv. 218, 220 (1961) :
The concept of sufficiency [in tort cases] . . . has nothing to do with ordi-
nary questions of credibility . . . . [However] courts do place outer bounds
on credibility, and testimony which is ruled incredible as a matter of law will
not be counted in determining sufficiency . . . . Courts have it in their power
to extend the notion of incredibility as a matter of law so as to contract the
jury's function substantially . . . . [But only in] an occasional extreme set
of circumstances [will they go] beyond the physical facts situation ....
106 194 F2d at 156.
167 Compare Wildeblood v. United States, 284 F2d 592, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(separate opinion), and Dyson v. United States, 97 A.2d 135 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App.
1953) (by implication), and Bicksler v. United States, 90 A.2d 233 (D.C. Munic. Ct.
App. 1952), and King v. United States, 90 A.2d 229 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1952),
with Reed v. United States, 93 A.2d 568 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953), vacated as
moot, id. at 570 (per curiam). Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §§213.6(6), 251.3
(Proposed Official Draft 1962) (testimony of the victim must be corroborated
to prove deviate sexual intercourse by force or intimidation or committed upon a
1963]
280 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the trier of fact the larger part of the credibility question.168  These cases
are compatible with the essential doctrine of Kelly that trial courts exercise
caution in homosexual cases involving decoys. Although in one sense
Kelly was an exercise of the normal appellate power to reverse for clear
insufficiency of evidence, 169 its cold-record evaluation of credibility by
means of circumstantial evidence was an extraordinary exercise of that
power.7 0 Rather than suggesting criteria and remanding for a new trial,
the court in Kelly decided the case by actually applying the criteria to the
facts before it in order to demonstrate a process and an attitude.171
According to Kelly, conviction for a prejudicial offense so easily
charged and so hard to defend against should rest upon a firmer basis than
merely the resolution of a credibility contest. Thus, the court sought
whatever additional elements of proof it could find to aid the determina-
tion by the trier of fact. The elements it ultimately relied on, however,
are of limited value. Evidence of defendant's good character is at most
an imperfect safeguard. Many homosexuals who want to preserve their
community standing lead a "double" life so that their friends and
acquaintances will be unaware of their homosexuality. 72 Similarly, the
Kelly requirement of corroboration as to presence at the alleged time and
place is a crude safeguard. Its introduction into evidence means relatively
little, but its absence can be significant, especially since it is an easy re-
quirement for the prosecution to fulfill."1 3 Thus, the most that a defendant
can expect from the Kelly "counsels," aside from corroboration as to time
and place, is an attitude of unusual caution by the trial court in evaluating
the evidence. Once the trial judge as trier of fact or instructor of the
minor, but need not be corroborated for public solicitation); MODr PENAL. CoDE
§ 207.5 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1959) (same).
In Reed, the only prosecution evidence was the testimony of the decoy, and the
defendant did not take the stand. The court considered it unimportant that the decoy's
testimony was not thus contradicted. Compare Grant v. State, 69 Ga. App. 835
(1943) (conviction for soliciting prostitution may rest entirely on the decoy's testi-
mony even though the accused does not take the stand). There is no mention of good
character evidence in Wildeblood, and in Dyson bad character was proven by admis-
sions of prior homosexual offenses. Good character evidence was introduced in
Bicksler and King, but in Bicksler it was only of general good character rather than
good character relevant to homosexuality.
168 King v. United States, supra note 167, at 231; see Wildeblood v. United States,
supra note 167; Bicksler v. United States, supra note 167.
'69 194 F.2d at 156 & n.17.
170The dissenting judge denounced the majority opinion as going beyond the
bounds of appellate review and usurping the function of the jury on nothing more
than a cold record. 194 F.2d at 156-57.
171 "We shall, for the present, refrain from imposing rigid requirements as to
quantity or character of proof in these cases, but we call to the attention of trial
courts certain considerations which we think should govern them in respect to these
charges." 194 F.2d at 154.
172 Fonzi, supra note 160, at 21, 50-51.
17- This requirement seems inconsistent with Kelly's purported notion of caution
and counsel given by an appellate court to a trial court. However, Kelly purported
to confine itself to caution and counsel because of reluctance to impose impossible
burdens on the prosecution and this requirement is far from an impossible burden.
Furthermore, this aspect of the case may explain reversal rather than remand for a
new trial in Kelly.
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jury 174 seeks to apply this attitude, the appellate court should exercise only
its normal scope of review.
175
There are other important elements of proof which Kelly did not
consider. The court stressed the importance of defendant's good char-
acter evidence, which is normally shown by evidence of good reputation. 176
Although the prosecution cannot initially introduce evidence of defendant's
bad reputation, prior specific conduct, or prior offenses to indicate de-
fendant's inclination to commit the crime, once defendant puts his character
in issue evidence of his bad reputation is admissible in rebuttal.1 77 Even
by taking the stand, the defendant may open the door for evidence of
other crimes and even misconduct to impeach his credibility. 178 Further-
more, some courts have permitted the prosecution initially to introduce
evidence of similar sex offenses.179 Yet Kelly's particular concern with
the risks of stigma and blackmail should preclude such evidence unless it
pertains to prior convictions.' 80
Evidence of defendant's good character might also be expanded to
include expert psychiatric testimony about his homosexual tendencies. 181
Serious problems arise, however, with respect to both admissibility of
individual opinion to show character and the reliability of the particular
174 Part of the background from which Kelly gathered its authority to prescribe
"counsels" was Fletcher v. United States, 158 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1946), and Freed
v. United States, 266 Fed. 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1920), where trial courts were reversed
for failure to give cautionary instructions to the jury concerning the testimony of a
paid drug addict informer and of an accomplice respectively. 194 F.2d at 152.
Reversals are more likely to occur when there has been a jury trial below, not
only because non-Kelly instructions will be obvious, but also because rules of caution
about natural prejudices need be less severely applied when a judge rather than a
jury is the trier of fact. Moreover, it cannot be expected that a trial judge will
articulate the fact-finding processes as fully when he is the trier of fact as when he
is instructing the jury how to evaluate the conflicting evidence. 16 CAN. B. REv.
572, 575 (1938) ; see United States v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1951) ; cf. Ott
v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 276 Mass. 566, 177 N.E. 542 (1931). Futher-
more, because of a jury's greater susceptibility to prejudice, the Kelly considerations
might be more severely applied in jury cases than in non-jury cases like Kelly.
175 See Wildeblood v. United States, 284 F.2d 592, 594, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(separate opinion); Bicksler v. United States, 90 A.2d 233 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App.
1953) ; King v. United States, 90 A.2d 229 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953) ; State v.
Vicknair, 103 La. 1921, 28 So. 273 (1900) ; 6 Ras JUDICATAE 538, 539 (1954).
17
6 McCopzicK, EvinENcE § 158, at 334-35 (1954).
177 See McCoRMICx, EvIDENCE § 157, at 327 (1954); id. § 158. Defendants in
homosexual cases may also be able to introduce the fact that they are married and
have children. State v. Sinnott 24 N.J. 408, 416, 132 A.2d 298, 302 (1957). In any
event, such evidence can be introduced indirectly. See King v. United States, 90 A.2d
229, 230 (D.C. Mnic. Ct App. 1953) (defendant's steady girl friend was character
witness).
178 See note 116 supra.
179 Ibid.
150 But see Dyson v. United States, 97 A.2d 135 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953),
which allowed admissions of prior offenses in a decoy homosexual assault case without
considering whether admissibility was in harmony with Kelly.
181 In Konvalinka v. United States, 162 A.2d 778, 780 (D.C. Munic. Ct App.
1960), aff'd, 287 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1961), psychiatric testimony was admitted, but
its admissibility was not contested on appeal.
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method of psychiatric examination.182  Although cases involving the
actual commission of sodomy have rejected psychiatric testimony on both
of these grounds, 8 3 the special need for further evidence in homosexual
overture cases due to a paucity of objective elements of proof might argue
for their admissibility. The individual opinion problem can be resolved
in favor of admissibility in these cases,184 especially if the prosecution is
also permitted to answer with its own or independent experts. 8 5 If the
defendant has not put character in issue, the prosecution's introduction of
psychiatric testimony in order to prove homosexual tendencies raises
essentially the same questions as the admissibility of prior offenses.
However, psychiatric testimony is fairer to a defendant than proof of prior
offenses because it recognizes the possibility of his subsequent reform. But
it is also more prejudicial because the trier of fact may convict by a "bad
man bad act" inference, or infer from the expert's testimony that the
defendant should be isolated from society or be subject to psychiatric
treatment regardless of the crime charged.
186
182 Compare People v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219, 266 P.2d 38 (1954) (disapproving
People v. Sellers, 103 Cal. App. 2d 830, 230 P.2d 398 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951), and
relying in part on statutes relating to the treatment of sexual psychopaths), and Curran,
Expert Psychiatric Evidence of Personality Traits, 103 U. PA. L. Rxv. 999 (1955),
and 42 CALIF. L. REv. 880 (1954), and 12 RuTGERs L. REv. 410 (1957), with State v.
Sinnott, 24 N.J. 408, 132 A.2d 298 (1957), and Falknor & Steffen, Evidence of Char-
acter: From the "Crucible of the Community" to the "Couch of the Psychiatrist," 102
U. PA. L. Rxv. 980 (1954).
183 People v. Sellers, supra note 182, State v. Sinnott, supra note 182.
184 The reliability of the psychiatric examination presents problems. See People
v. Jones, 42 Cal. 2d 219, 225, 266 P.2d 38, 42-43 (1954) ; State v. Sinnott, 24 N.J.
408, 421-24, 427-28, 132 A2d 298, 305-07, 309-10 (1957); State v. Lindemuth, 56
N.M. 257, 271-74, 243 P.2d 325, 334-36 (1952) ; Curran, supra note 182, at 1014-19;
Dession, Freedman, Donnelly & Redlich, Drug-Induced Revelation and Criminal In-
vestigation, 62 YALE L.J. 315 (1953); Macdonald, Truth Serum, 46 J. CRam. L.,
C. & P.S. 259 (1955) ; Muehlberger, Interrogation Under Drug Influence, 42 J. CRim.
L., C. & P.S. 513, 525-26 (1951) ; 42 CALIF. L. REv. 880, 884 (1954) ; 12 RUTGERs L.
Rxv. 410, 413 (1957).
185 See State v. Sinnott, supra note 184, at 430, 132 A.2d at 310; Curran, supra
note 182, at 1010-12; Falknor & Steffen, supra note 182, at 990-91; 12 RUTGERS L.
REv. 410, 412-13 (1957). Concern that introduction of the state's expert testimony
in rebuttal will develop into a battle of the experts has led to the suggestion that
defendants not introduce psychiatric testimony. See State v. Sinnott, supra at 430,
132 A.2d at 310-11; 12 RUTGERS L. REv. 410, 413 (1958). A further complication is
the possibility of due process and self-incrimination problems when the defendant is
compelled to submit to a psychiatric examination on an issue probative of guilt. See
generally Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307-09 (1963); Silving, Testing of the
Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HARv. L. REv. 683 (1956) ; 8 UTAH L. REv. 141
(1962). Falknor & Steffen, supra note 182, at 990-91, suggests that the state could
introduce psychiatric testimony even if the defendant introduced evidence of his good
reputation in the traditional manner. In People v. Giani, 145 Cal. App. 2d 539, 302
P.2d 813 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956), the state was not permitted to adduce defendant's
admission that he was a homosexual because it did not raise enough of a probability
that he committed the act in question. However, defendant's admission of specific
prior homosexual acts were held admissible in Dyson v. United States, 97 A.2d 135
(D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953).
186 See Curran, supra note 182, at 1010-11. For an indication of the extent to
which juries will be influenced by the testimony of the psychiatrist, see James, Juror's
Evaluation of Expert Psychiatric Testimony, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 75 (1960). This study
deals with testimony on the issue of criminal responsibility and therefore its suggestion
that jurors are not likely to be influenced by the expert in their ultimate conclusions,
id. at 95, may be of limited value when the issue is whether the defendant committed
the crime.
ENFORCEMENT OF HOMOSEXUAL LAWS
Whereas in Kelly defendant denied that he had engaged in the pro-
hibited conduct, in Seitner v. United States,17 defendant admitted the
touching in an assault case but claimed that the officer consented. The
only evidence on the issue was the conflicting testimony of the defendant
and the plainclothsman. The court held that Kelly did not require cor-
roboration of the lack of consent.' 88
Concededly, both the Kelly "counsels" and the additional elements of
proof suggested in this Note are not helpful on the issue of consent. But
if the officer is mistaken or testifies falsely about his own apparent consent,
defendant must then engage in a Kelly-type credibility contest. Although
a corroboration requirement for lack of apparent consent would make
prosecution for the touching virtually impossible, an attitude of unusual
caution could still prevail. This attitude, however, would be virtually
unreviewable. Similarly, the Kelly "counsels" are not helpful when any
other defense based upon the decoy's conduct is claimed,' s9 although an
attitude of caution would still seem to be necessary.
The court in Kelly appeared especially concerned with the effect of
conviction on the defendant's standing in the community. However, since
these collateral effects are less harmful to the defendant who actually
admits homosexual conduct, an attitude of caution is not essential when a
defense is based on the decoy's conduct. 90  However, when entrapment
is claimed, caution should be required since the concern is no longer solely
with conviction and its collateral effects but also with abuse of law enforce-
ment processes upon situational offenders.
187 143 A.2d 101 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 262 F.2d 710
(D.C. Cir. 1958).
1s8 The defendant argued before the circuit court of appeals that his conviction
should be reversed on the authority of Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578 (D.C.
Cir. 1956) (consent a defense to the assault consisting of homosexual touching).
However, the municipal court of appeals committed no error with respect to the appli-
cation of the legal rule of Guarro; the error, if any, was failure to use Kelly caution
in finding the necessary facts for the application of that rule. Guarro was no help
to the defendant since the court in Guarro stated that the facts relevant to the consent
issue in that case were not disputed. Guarro v. United States, sepra at 581.
189 If predisposition is relevant in entrapment, then bad character and expert
psychiatric testimony remain important elements of proof.
190 The defendant may make alternative claims that he did not commit the offense,
but that if he did, the officer's conduct vitiated it. Compare Day v. United States, 148
A.2d 462, 463 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1959), and Dyson v. United States, 97 A.2d 135,
137 (D.C. Munic. Ct App. 1953), with Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641, 654 n.10
(1st Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829 (1963), and Hansford v. United States,
303 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1963), and 70 HARv. L. Ray. 1302, 1303 (1957). How-
ever, his testimony may not cover both claims. Sylvia v. United States, 312 F.2d
145 (1st Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963) ; 70 HAIv. L. Ray. 1302, 1303
(1957) ; see Marko v. United States, 314 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1963). If he pleads in
the alternative but his testimony covers only one claim, the jury should receive a
cautionary charge from the trial court even though the officer's testimony which
contradicts the defendant's unsupported plea is not contradicted by other evidence.
Cf. Reed v. United States, 93 A.2d 568 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953), vacated as
moot, id. at 570 (per curiam).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Even if the statutory objectives to deter more consummate crime
and prevent annoyances to the public are served by the use of decoys to
harass without actual prosecutions, 1' 1 some prosecutions are necessary to
provide judicial supervision of police practices. 1 92  When prosecutions do
occur, the distinction between innocent conversation and homosexual
overtures requires unusually close attention to the factual situation. The
task of finding criminality in more provocative behavior or touching is
not as difficult. However, in all homosexual overture offenses involving
decoys the court must determine criminality on the basis of the conduct
of both the defendant and the decoy. Unless the police use scientific
evidence-gathering devices, the inherent limitations of the ordinary testi-
monial evidence complicates the problem further. 9 3 Nevertheless, courts
must not allow the pressures of the practical situation to result in the
virtual elimination of legitimate defenses, since this approach would expand
the statutes to condemn homosexual tendencies. On the other hand, de-
coys are the only practicable means of enforcing homosexuality statutes.
Therefore, if unfounded defenses based on the activity of decoys become
increasingly successful, the statutes themselves will become ineffective.
Harold Jacobs t
191 See note 19 supra.
192 See Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To Invoke the Criminal Process: Low
Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 580-81 (1960) ;
cf. NATIoNAL CoMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAw-
LESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 1-10 (1931); Foote, Law and Police Practices:
Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 16, 19 (1957). The limited
availability of tort claims for false arrest, see, e.g., Foote, Tort Remedies for Police
Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. Rxv. 493, 500-01 (1955), is further
accentuated in homosexual offenses by the risk that social stigma may attach to
anyone who is even accused of such an offense.
19 3 For example, the decoy could carry a device to record the conversation or
to broadcast it to another police officer located nearby who could arrive immediately
to identify the voice. Cf. People v. Lewis, 214 Cal. App. 2d 856, 29 Cal. Rptr. 825
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (decoy with miniature radio transmitter in house of prostitu-
tion) ; People v. Hornbeck, 277 App. Div. 1136, 101 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184 (1950) (dictum)
(sound recording of admission over telephone sufficient to corroborate testimony of
rape prosecutrix).
f LL.B. 1963, University of Pennsylvania. Editor, Volumes 109, 111.
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